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Taiwan 
Conventional Deterrence, Seft Power, and the Nuclear Option 
VINCENT WEI-CHENG WANG 
Taiwan (officially Republic of China [ROC]) meets most definitions of existen-
tial insecurity-through its entire experience as a separate political entity-in a 
way that few other Asian cases do (Solingen 2007: u5). Not only does it face the 
People's Republic of China's [PRC's]) unremitting political, economic, and mili-
tary pressure, but its statehood is unrecognized by most major states and intergov-
ernmental organizations. China's rapid military buildup since 1990 has raised the 
concern that the cross-Strait military balance has begun to shift in China's favor 
(Office of the Secretary of Defense 2006: 37; Shambaugh 2000). The military im-
balance is seen as further endangering Taiwan's political survival and way oflife. 
Yet Taiwan has no recourse to global or regional security organizations. No 
major power except the United States has a commitment to Taiwan's security. And 
that commitment is not unconditional. Taiwan exemplifies Michael Mandelbaum's 
definition of"orphan"-a state that was aligned with the United States during the 
Cold War but "felt more threatened and less protected than the allies" because it 
faced neighbors that did not accept the legitimacy of its existence as a sovereign 
state and had "neither formal treaties of alliance nor American troops on [its terri-
tory]" (Mandelbaum 1995: 28-29). 
Nonetheless, Taiwan figures prominently in the security picture in twenty-
first-century Asia for two reasons. First, facing an acute threat, Taiwan has been 
labeled a "virtual nuclear power" or "virtual proliferant" (Mack 1997)-that could 
acquire nuclear weapons in a relatively short time due to its well-developed in-
dustrial infrastructure, civilian nuclear expertise, and past attempt at developing a 
nuclear weapon program. The October 2006 North Korean nuclear test rekindled 
speculation as to whether Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea might become the 
"next nuclear states" should a nuclear arms race ensue in East Asia (Rosen 2006). 
Taiwan 
Second, Taiwan is important to Asian regional security because of the possibility 
of a conflict between two major nuclear powers. China claims the right to use 
force against Taiwan while the United States, under the Taiwan Relations Act, 
might choose to intervene in a cross-Strait conflict. 
This chapter makes four main arguments. First, to cope with its unique secu-
rity situation and challenge, Taiwan has adopted a broad strategy combining ele-
ments of"hard power" and "soft power" (Nye 2004). Since 1949 Taiwan's security 
strategy has incorporated four elements: (1) self-defense, (2) alliance (explicit or 
implicit), (3) economic statecraft, and (4) democracy.1 Second, while Taiwan's ec-
onomic power and democratic example increase the international community's 
stake in Taiwan, ultimately its survival depends on its own conventional deter-
rence capability and the U.S. security commitment. Third, since Taiwan has for-
sworn its own nuclear weapon program and China's objective concerning Taiwan 
is mainly political (unification), nuclear weapons play only an indirect role in 
Taiwan's defense strategy. The important question is whether the U.S. security 
commitment to Taiwan (including an implicit nuclear umbrella) remains credible. 
Fourth, while it is plausible to speculate that Taiwan might reconsider its nuclear 
option under certain conditions, its most realistic security strategy remains a pru-
dent blend of strengthened self-defense, credible U.S. political and military sup-
port, increased international community stake in Taiwan, and denying China 
excuses to launch an unprovoked attack. 
These arguments are developed in the rest of the chapter, which has four sec-
tions. The first section discusses the nature of the China threat to Taiwan. The 
subsequent section investigates how Taiwan has dealt with that threat. The third 
section reviews Taiwan's past attempt at developing nuclear weapons and draws 
some lessons. The final section explores the conditions under which Taiwan might 
reconsider nuclear or other offensive options. 
The China Threat 
Ever since the ROC moved to Taiwan in 1949 as a result of the Chinese civil 
War between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party, the PRC has 
sought to bring Taiwan under its control. While China's strategic objective of 
unifying Taiwan has remained unaltered, its tacti~s have evolved over time. In the 
r95os-6os, China threatened to "liberate" Taiwan by force. However, as it lacked 
amphibious warfare capabilities, China's threats were more rhetorical than real. 
China's bombardment of the ROC-held islands ofKinmen and Matsu constituted 
arguably the most serious military episode during that period (Tsou 1959). 
After the United States and the PRC established diplomatic relations in 1979, 
China shifted its emphasis to "peaceful reunification" but did not renounce the 
use of force against Taiwan. Over time, the China threat to Taiwan became 
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multifaceted, including constricting Taiwan's international space, manipulating 
fissures in Taiwan's young democracy, and absorbing Taiwan's outward invest-
ment and trade flows. However, it is China's military buildup in recent years that 
poses the greatest threat to Taiwan's security. 
Until the end of the 1980s, China's military modernization was low priority-
ranking last in Deng Xiaoping's "Four Modernizations"-mainly due to budg-
etary constraints. China's rapid economic growth and the availability of mili-
tary hardware from Russia spurred China's military modernization. Beginning in 
1990, China's defense expenditure has grown at double-digit rates. The Pentagon's 
annual reports on China's military power point out that while preparing for a 
"Taiwan contingency" remains the primary focus of China's military moderniza-
tion, it also aims to project military power in the broader Asia-Pacific region (Of-
fice of the Secretary of Defense 2006). In 2005, China passed the Anti-Secession 
Law, sanctioning the use of"non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to 
protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity" under certain conditions yet 
to be defined. 
China's military options against Taiwan include (1) persuasion and coercion; 
(2) limited force options-such as employing information operations, special op-
eration forces on Taiwan, and missile or air strikes on key military or politi-
cal sites-to try to break the will of Taiwan's leadership and population; (3) air 
and missile campaign; (4) blockade; and (5) amphibious invasion. In recent years, 
China's military modernization has placed greater emphasis on developing the 
capabilities to achieve air and naval superiority over Taiwan, deny or complicate 
possible U.S. intervention, and compel Taiwan to accept China's terms for unifi-
cation. 2 If China decides to use force against Taiwan, its most pl.ausible course of 
action would be a conventional war aimed at achieving quick victory and keeping 
Taiwan's economic infrastructure intact. 
This raises questions about the nuclear dimension. Unlike most analysts, James 
Nolt (1999) argues that China has no real military option in dealing with Taiwan 
and can only defeat Taiwan by using nuclear weapons. But as China's goal is pri-
marily political (unification), do nuclear weapons serve any purpose? China offi-
cially espouses a no-first-use (NFU) policy-it will not be the first to use nuclear 
weapons against other states. But former Chinese chief arms control negotiator, 
Sha Zukang, claimed that China's NFU commitment does not extend to Taiwan, 
because "Taiwan is a province of China, not a state, so the policy of no-first-use 
does not apply" (Straits Times 1996: 3). Sha's statement was later corrected by the 
Chinese government. In 1999 a Foreign Ministry spokesman, Sun Yuxi, when 
asked if China would use nuclear weapons against Taiwan, extended China's 
NFU principle to Taiwan: "We will not be the first to use nuclear weapons and 
will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon countries and regions, 
let alone against our Taiwan compatriots" (New York Times 1999). 
Taiwan 
From time to time certain statements by senior Chinese military officers raised 
doubt about China's NFU pledge and possible use of nuclear weapons in a Taiwan 
contingency.3 In October 1995, Xiong Guangkai, who is now the deputy chief 
of the general staff of the People's Liberation Army, told Chas Freeman, a former 
Pentagon official, that China would consider using nuclear weapons in a Taiwan 
conflict. Freeman quoted Xiong as saying that Americans should worry more 
about Los Angeles than Taipei (New York Times 2005). In July 2005, General Zhu 
Chenghu, then at National Defense University, said: "If the Americans draw their 
missiles and precision-guided ammunition on to the target zones on China's ter-
ritory, I think we will have to respond with nuclear weapons" (New York Times 
2005). His statement raised the possibility of miscalculation and escalation in a 
Sino-American war over Taiwan. 
Given the opaque nature of the PRC military, it is difficult to know whether 
these nuclear threats represented the generals' own opinions or a test balloon for 
official policy. It is reasonable to argue that China's main threat to Taiwan is con-
ventional, such as missile or amphibious attack, and that Beijing is gaining the 
upper hand in the conventional military balance across the Strait. 
Taiwan's Response: Conventional Deterrence 
and Possible U.S. Intervention 
Taiwan's grand strategy in coping with the China threat includes the key "soft 
power" dimension. In keeping with the purpose of this _book and space constraint, 
here I provide only a brief overview of the soft power dimension. During the first 
two decades of the Cold War, Taiwan was a key frontline state in the U.S.-led 
geostrategic containment of the international communist threat (Garver 1997). 
It was protected by the U.S. defense commitment that included extended deter-
rence. In the 196os-7os, its export-led economic development model became suc-
cessful, but its diplomatic fortunes declined. Taiwan's importance in global trade 
and production became a key pillar of its security. And, starting in the late 1980s, 
Taiwan evolved into a vibrant democracy, in contrast to China's 1989 crackdown 
on democracy protestors and its continued poor human rights record. Taiwan po-
sitioned itself as a model in global Third Wave democratization worthy of interna-
tional support and recognition. In the early 1990s, Taiwan launched a "Go South" 
policy-buttressed by trade and investment-toward Southeast Asia, an impor-
tant region to Taiwan. In 1999, the global information industry was disrupted as a 
result of Taiwan's earthquake. This disruption demonstrated Taiwan's vital role in 
the global semiconductor industry, leading one analyst to argue that Taiwan had a 
"silicon shield" against Chinese attack (Addison 2001). "Soft power" instruments 
such as democracy, trade, and popular culture are key elements of Taiwan's com-
prehensive security strategy. 
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Although Taiwan's security is embedded in world trade and global democrati-
zation, the realist premise of self-help in an anarchic international system is criti-
cal. Given the asymmetry vis-a-vis China, Taiwan's defense preparation against 
the Chinese military threat rests on two pillars: a formidable conventional mili-
tary force and a close relationship with the United States (Hickey 1997= 37). Tai-
wan appears to have a three-layered strategy: (1) deterring China by making the 
cost of invasion unacceptably high; (2) ifthat fails, engaging China independently 
long enough for (3) assistance from a powerful outside actor (the United States). 
With the world's sixteenth largest active troop size (290,000) and nineteenth 
highest military expenditure (USs7.9 bi11ion in 2005), Taiwan has a considerable 
conventional military force. However, its adversary has the world's largest active 
troop size (2.25 mi11ion) and the second largest military expenditure (USs65 bil-
lion in 2004).4 Purchasing advanced weapons has been important for Taiwan's 
security. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
data, between 1977 and 2006 Taiwan imported USs28.4 billion worth of arms, 
making it the seventh largest importer of arms in the world (for the same period, 
China was the eighth largest arms importer, receiving USs28.2 bi11ion, mostly 
after 1999). 5 
Maintaining a close relationship with the United States is crucial for Taiwan. 
Its armed forces are equipped with weapons obtained primarily from the United 
States. In recent years, it has also procured some weapons from other Western 
countries (e.g., sixty French Mirage fighter jets in 1992) and has emphasized in-
digenous military production in certain fields to achieve greater "self-reliance." 
U.S. arms sales enabled Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense capabilities. 
From FY1950 to FY2006, the United States sold Taiwan USs18.3 billion of mili-
tary equipment under the foreign military sales program and USs3.2 bi11ion worth 
of commercial exports licensed under the Arms Export Control Act (Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency n.d.). In 2007, Taiwan's legislature approved funds 
for the purchase of certain weapon systems approved by the George W. Bush 
administration in 2001, including P-3 Orion antisubmarine aircraft, the Patriot 
Advanced Capability (PAC-2 upgrade) missile defense system, and a feasibility 
study of a diesel-electric submarine. 
In recent years, to cope with the growing China threat, Taiwan has taken mea-
sures to counter a possible three-phased Chinese attack: (1) a sudden, overwhelm-
ing attack on critical strategic and military targets using air power and special 
forces designed to force a rapid end to the war; (2) an effective naval blockade 
of major ports, to be followed by an extended air campaign to cripple Taiwan 
economically and militarily; and (3) an amphibious landing to facilitate a multi-
divisional armored and mechanized attack on the political center (Yang 2007). To 
survive air strikes, Taiwan has hardened command, control, and communication 
Taiwan 
centers and improved its air defense system. To counter a naval blockade, the 
ROC Navy has put increasing emphasis on antisubmarine warfare. To thwart an 
amphibious landing, Taiwan's ground forces have undergone a major streamlining 
and restructuring into composite brigades capable of conducting two-dimensional 
operations. Taiwan is also developing offensive countermeasures in an attempt to 
destroy or degrade PLA war-fighting assets on the mainland. 
Although Taiwan's efforts are considerable, its conventional deterrence capa-
bility may be in relative decline for three reasons. First, the rapid pace of Chinese 
military modernization-double-digit growths in annual defense spending since 
1990-makes it difficult for Taiwan to keep pace with China. Second, in recent 
years, as a result of spending more on health care and social welfare, Taiwan's 
defense expenditure has declined in absolute and relative terms. 6 Third, because 
the United States is mired in Iraq and is increasingly dependent on Chinese co-
operation on various issues (e.g., North Korea), its commitment to Taiwan, whose 
leadership seems to be pushing for de jure independence, has become more am-
biguous and contingent. 
The last point illustrates an inherent alliance dilemma. In a seminal work, 
Glenn Snyder discusses the logics of "abandonment" and "entrapment" and con-
cludes "alliance bargaining considerations ... tend to favor a strategy of weak 
or ambiguous commitment" (Snyder 1984: 467). In the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, 
Taiwan has always feared abandonment by the United States. In contrast, the 
United States fears entrapment, "being dragged into a c~mflict over an ally's inter-
ests that one does not share, or shares only partially." 
Historically, the United States has played a critical role in Taiwan's security. 
Under its defense treaty with Taiwan (1954-78), the United States dispatched the 
Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait and extended its nuclear umbrella to 
Taiwan. Recently declassified material shows that from January 1958 to July 1974, 
the United States stored nuclear weapons on Taiwan.7 U.S. protection prevented 
a Chinese attack on Taiwan. 
In December 1978, as one of the conditions for normalizing relations with 
the PRC, the United States abrogated the 1954 defense treaty with Taiwan. U.S. 
Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to shore up Taiwan's security. 
However, it is debatable whether the "residual" U.S. commitment to Taiwan's 
security under the TRA constitutes an implicit nuclear umbrella. The TRA de-
clares that it is the policy of the United States to "consider any effort to determine 
the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means ... a threat to the peace and 
security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States," 
to provide Taiwan with "arms of a defensive character," and to "maintain the ca-
pacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion 
that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people 
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on Taiwan" (Taiwan Relations Act 1979). But the TRA is silent on whether the 
United States will defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. Snyder's in-
sights on entrapment help explain why the United States adopts a policy of "stra-
tegic ambiguity" toward the Taiwan Strait. It is intended to keep both China and 
Taiwan in check. Unlike Japan or South Korea-both treaty allies of the United 
States-Taiwan cannot for certain rely on America's extended deterrence com-
mitment. It must work hard to cultivate American support. 
Given its existential insecurity and the implicit and ambiguous commitment 
of its only ally, Taiwan has often been identified as a country with good reasons 
for possessing nuclear weapons as part of its comprehensive strategy of survival. 
Andrew Mack grouped Taiwan along with Japan, South Korea, and North Korea 
in a category called "virtual nuclear powers" who could acquire nuclear weapons 
in a relatively short time but have chosen not to do so (Mack 1997). 
Taiwan's Nuclear Programs and U.S. Policies 
During the Cold War 
It is useful to discuss Taiwan's past, present, and future nuclear policy in the 
context of the larger issue of why states build nuclear weapons. The Taiwan case 
confirms insights from theories on the role of nuclear weapons in a country's se-
curity policy but also adds to its unique complexity. It can be fruitfully compared 
with other countries like Israel that face existential insecurity. 
States seek nuclear weapons for many reasons: coping with an acute threat, pres-
tige, political clout, technology, and economic benefits (Cirincione 2007; Pamper 
2005). Scott Sagan (1996-97) advances three "models" of states' nuclear decisions: 
(1) "the security model": states build weapons to increase nationarsecurity against 
foreign threats, especially nuclear threats; (2) the "domestic politics model": nu-
clear weapons are viewed as political tools to advance parochial domestic and 
bureaucratic interests; and (3) "the norms model": nuclear weapon decisions are 
made because weapons acquisition, or restraint in weapons development, provides 
an important normative symbol of a state's modernity and identity. 
Goldstein (2000) argues that despite the end of the Cold War, nuclear deter-
rence will remain at the core of the security policies of the world's great powers 
and will continue to be an attractive option for many less powerful states worried 
about adversaries whose capabilities they cannot match. America's extended de-
terrence during the Cold War persuaded many, but not all, of its allies to forego 
nuclear weapons, thus contributing to the success of the U.S.-led nonproliferation 
regime (Mandelbaum 1995: 25-26). 
A patron can bolster the credibility of its extended deterrence commitment by 
establishing treaty obligations for the defense of the client state or storing nuclear 
weapons on the soil of the client state. Recently declassified material shows that 
Taiwan 4Il 
the United States secretly deployed nuclear bombs in twenty-seven countries and 
territories during the Cold War (National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 
1999; Norris, Arkin, and Burr 1999). 
During the Cold War the United States sought to achieve three goals in the 
nuclear domain: (1) nonproliferation and arms control (to enhance global security 
and norm development), (2) extended deterrence (to preserve alliance solidarity 
and U.S. reputation), and (3) commercial gain (to benefit the American nuclear 
power industry). This three-pronged strategy was linked by the quid pro quo 
mandated in the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): the five nuclear 
weapon states (the United States, the USSR, Britain, France, and the PRC) agreed 
not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to other states, 
and nonnuclear weapon states agreed not to seek or develop nuclear weapons in 
return for their "inalienable right" to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
(Article IV, Sec. 1), subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safe-
guards. Under the NPT, nuclear powers have a responsibility to assist developing 
countries with their energy needs (Article IV, Sec. 2). 8 These multiple goals-
sometimes complementary and sometimes contradictory-were clearly at work in 
the various roles the United States played in Taiwan's civilian and military nuclear 
programs during the Cold War. 
Taiwan's Nuclear Program During the Cold War 
Taiwan's civilian nuclear power and nuclear weapon programs started at about 
the same time-in the 1960s. It is useful to consider. these two programs to-
gether because the United States played key roles in both, and because there is sub-
stantial technological overlap between them (the first stage of making nuclear 
Weapons-the production of fissile materials, such as uranium-233, uranium-235, 
or plutonium-239-is the same as for generating nuclear power) (Chung 2004a; 
r37). Taiwanese officials are still reticent about Taiwan's abandoned nuclear weapon 
program, but in recent years more information has emerged. Table 14-1 summa-
rizes the key developments of Taiwan's nuclear program during the Cold War.9 
The table reveals several important lessons. First, Taiwan's nuclear weapon as-
pirations were driven by an acute sense of insecurity. The genesis of the Hsin 
Chu Project was a direct result of China's successful explosion of a nuclear bomb 
in 1964. The prospect that the PRC could now use nuclear weapons to wipe out 
1'aiwan was deeply unsettling to ROC President Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang tried 
to persuade U.S. President Lyndon Johnson to take out China's nascent nuclear 
arsenal but to no avail. So he, and especially his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, decided 
to develop an indigenous nuclear weapon program. 
There was dissent. Professor Ta-you Wu, former president of Academia Sinica 
in Taipei and then director of the Science Development Advisory Committee of 
TABLE 14-I. 
Timeline of Taiwan's Nuclear Program During the Cold War 
1955 Atomic Energy Council (AEC) founded to promote peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
Taipower created Atomic Power Research Commission. 
National Tsinghua University (NTHU) reopened in Hsin Chu, with a Graduate 
Institute of Atomic Science. 
1956 Taiwan opened its first nuclear reactor, provided by the United States, at NTHU. 
1964 China successfully tested nuclear weapons, stimulating Taiwan to develop a full-scale 
nuclear program. 
1965 The predecessor of the military-run Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology 
(CSIST) was established. The proposed First Institute would become the Institute for 
Nuclear Energy Research (INER). 
1967 The US$140 million Hsin Chu Project was launched, consisting primarily of 
procuring and operating a heavy-water reactor, a heavy-water production plant, a 
reprocessing research lab, and a plutonium separation plant. 
1968 ROCjoined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
Supervision of INER was moved to AEC. 
1969 INER purchased a small heavy-water reactor (40 megawatt), dubbed Taiwan Research 
Reactor (TRR), from Canada, which became operational in 1973. 
INER served mainly to facilitate Taiwan's procurement of elements to produce 
plutonium. 
1971 IAEA negotiation of safeguard agreement short-circuited by the U.N. transfer of 
recognition. Eventually, agreement reached so the United States became the ultimate 
legal guarantor of Taiwan's nonnuclear status. 
1974 CIA concluded that Taiwan was working toward a nuclear weapon capability and 
would be capable of producing a nuclear weapon within five years. 
1976 Premier Chiang Ching-kuo promised Taiwan would not acquire its own reprocessing 
facilities or engage in any activities related to reprocessing. 
1977 United States pressured Taiwan to dismantle reprocessing facilities and return U.S.-
supplied plutonium. Taiwan's nuclear program was brought under cqntrol, but 
concerns remained. 
1978 President Jimmy Carter normalized relations with the PRC. 
Taipower's first nuclear reactor began producing electricity. Over the years, the 
amount of electricity generated by Taipower's six reactors, all U.S.-made, increased 
to 20 percent of Taiwan's electricity needs. The fourth nuclear plant, with two more 
modern reactors, is scheduled to begin operation in 2006-07 (with the delay in 2000, 
it was not finished as of March 2008). 
1987 INER began building a multiple hot cell facility. 
1988 Colonel Chang Hsien-yi, deputy director of!NER and a CIA spy, defected and 
revealed Taiwan's plans. The CIA estimated that Taiwan was within one or two years 
of developing a nuclear bomb. 
President Chiang Ching-kuo died. 
U.S. government agencies and IAEA inspectors shut down TRR and the hot cell. 
President Lee Teng-hui promised President Ronald Reagan that Taiwan would agree 
to conclusively and verifiably end its nuclear weapon program. 
SOURCES: Author's compilation using information in Mitchell (2004), Albright and Gay (1998), Durr (1999), 
and Chung (2004a). 
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National Science Council, wrote to Chiang to oppose the Hsin Chu Project on 
the grounds that the plan underestimated the true costs, risked confrontation with 
the United States, and overestimated the chance ofsuccess.10 Yet Taiwan's author-
itarian political leaders at the time overruled protests like that of Wu, thwarted an 
informed public debate, and permitted the clandestine execution of the project. 
The military fully supported the Hsin Chu Project by providing manpower and 
resources. The five-year USs140 million (NTs4.8 billion) project amounted to 
15 percent of the central government net expenditures ofNTs32.2 billion in 1968 
(Chung 2004a: 158). 
National pride was another impetus. In 1957, Ors. Chen-ning Yang and Tsung-
dao Lee of the University of Chicago became the first ethnic Chinese scientists to 
win the Nobel Prize in physics. This inspired many young, bright, and idealistic 
students in Taiwan to study nuclear physics, and the military tapped into this tal-
ent pool. 
"Dr. H's" experience is illustrative. After graduating from one of Taiwan's top 
high schools, he chose to study physics at the military-run Chung-cheng Institute 
of Technology (CCIT). CCIT, Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology 
(CSIST), and the Institute for Nuclear Energy Research (INER) are all located 
in Lung Tan, about forty minutes by car from Taipei. After college, Dr. H was 
assigned to INER and after two years was sent to study in the United States, 
where he received a Ph.D. and had a postdoctoral fellowship before returning to 
INER. He recalled: "At that time, INER employed over one thousand people. 
On average, each researcher had two support staffers. The pay was excellent and 
the morale was high. I felt proud about what I was doing, because I was young and 
prone to following orders."11 
The reactor purchased by INER, the Taiwan Research Reactor (TRR), was 
the same design as Canada's National Research eXperimental reactor; it had a 
"cousin" in South Asia-the CIRUS reactor India purchased in 1960. (Fourteen 
years later, in 1974, India made and tested a nuclear device fabricated from the 
plutonium produced by that reactor.) At full operation, TRR could produce ten 
kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium each year; in twelve years it could have 
produced sufficient weapon-grade plutonium for a small number of nuclear weap-
ons.12 TRR reached critical mass on January 3, 1973· 
Taiwan's nuclear weapon program accelerated in the 1970s. The quickening 
pace correlated directly with the nation's growing diplomatic and security con-
cerns: the ROC was expelled from the United Nations (U.N.) in 1971, and there-
after from all U.N.-affiliated organizations.13 The Nixon Doctrine signified the 
U.S. desire to reduce its military burden in Asia, culminating in the fall of Saigon 
in 1975. In 1972, Nixon visited mainland China and signed the Shanghai Com-
munique, committing the United States to normalize relations with China. On 
4I4 VINCENT WEI-CHENG WANG 
December 15, 1978, President Jimmy Carter announced that the United States 
would recognize Beijing and sever diplomatic ties with Taipei on January 1, 1979. 
These diplomatic setbacks heightened Taiwan's insecurity and fear of abandon-
ment by the United States. 
The second lesson is that the attitudes and actions of the United States-
informed by its national interests-was a key enabling or constraining factor in 
Taiwan's tortuous nuclear weapon development program. During the Cold War, 
the United States sought to pursue several goals-including preventing the spread 
of communism, nuclear nonproliferation, and commercial interests of its nuclear 
energy industry. 
In 1954, Presidents Eisenhower and Chiang signed a mutual defense treaty, in-
corporating Taiwan in the United States alliance system in East Asia. Taiwan 
benefited from Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program. During the Offshore Is-
land Crises of 1955 and 1958, Eisenhower contemplated using nuclear weapons 
against the PRC but was also concerned about "embroilment" in Chiang's futile 
campaign to militarily retake the mainland, which could have triggered a wider 
conflict involving the two superpowers (Tsou 1959). His dilemma illustrated the 
patron state's fear of entrapment. 
Taiwan's civilian and military nuclear programs benefited from direct and 
indirect U.S. assistance. The United States was both the guarantor of Taiwan's 
nonnuclear weapon status and the chief supplier of key materials, facilities, and 
technologies to Taiwan's nuclear power industry. Consequently, both the United 
States and Taiwan reached a reciprocal "bargain" under the NPT. All of the state-
owned Taipower's eight light-water reactors used to generate electricity were pro-
vided by leading American companies (General Electric and Westinghouse) that 
sold package deals, including fuel and repossession of spent fuel. 
Other than some hydraulic power, Taiwan lacks any significant raw energy 
sources. It imports over 97 percent of raw materials for its energy needs. Com-
pared to other sources of energy, nuclear fuel is a better choice from a strategic 
standpoint (it is less susceptible to wartime energy shortage or blockade) because 
of its compactness and density. Its importance will increase in the future. So will 
the nuclear expertise. 
The U.S. attitude toward Taiwan's military nuclear program was even more in-
triguing. The United States assisted Taiwan in acquiring the TRR from Canada, 
and enriched uranium from South Africa. Most of Taiwan's scientists in nuclear 
physics and related fields studied in the United States or Canada. Thus it appears 
that the United States permitted (or wanted) Taiwan to possess certain nuclear ca-
pabilities as a potential strategic counterweight to China. Yet as the main architect 
and chief enforcer of the nonproliferation regime, the United States did not want 
Taiwan's nuclear program to get out of control. 
Taiwan 
In January 1988, a U.S.-trained scientist and spy dealt a decisive blow to 
Taiwan's nuclear weapon program. Colonel Chang Hsien-yi, deputy director 
of INER, defected to the United States, carrying with him sensitive informa-
tion about the nuclear weapon program at INER. While studying in the United 
States, Chang had been recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). At 
the INER, he monitored Taiwan's nuclear program for the U.S. government.14 
Armed with incriminating evidence provided by Chang, President Reagan de-
manded that the new president of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui, conclusively and verifi-
ably shut down Taiwan's nuclear weapon program. The Chang Hsien-yi incident 
marked the end of Taiwan's nuclear weapon program and the associated Tien Ma 
(Sky House) missile program (Minnick 2002). 
Since 1988, Taiwan's official position has been that it will not apply its scientific 
know-how to build nuclear weapons (China Post 1997). Those closely involved in 
Taiwan's nuclear weapon program (e.g., President Chiang Ching-kuo and Gen-
eral Hau Pei-tsun, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) viewed Chang as a traitor 
who caused the fatal setback to Taiwan's nuclear aspirations. Americans generally 
viewed the end of Taiwan's nuclear weapon program as a success. The Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists hailed this as a "nuclear nightmare averted" (Albright and Gay 
1998). Ambassador James Lilley said that he believed it was time for the Chang 
Hsien-yi case to be "publicly acknowledged as a success, a classic in the annals of 
intelligence" (Weiner 1997).15 
However, today in Taiwan's open environment, opinions about Chang seem to 
be changing. Those who believe that reviving the nuciear option is a bad choice 
for Taiwan generally have a more balanced view on Chang (there were technical 
and nontechnical limitations to Taiwan's nuclear project, and what Chang did 
may have averted a disaster for Taiwan). Others argue that in Taiwan's democratic 
and open society today it is highly unlikely that a serious undertaking such as 
developing nuclear weapons could proceed secretly without public knowledge 
or media scrutiny. A former national security aide to President Chen Shui-bian 
opines that it would be hard to prevent a second "Chang Hsien-yi incident" from 
happening.16 
The Chang incident threw INER into disarray. Many INER researchers sud-
denly lost their raison d'etre. Although the United States took decisive measures 
to end Taiwan's nuclear weapon program, it did not ask (or allow) the INER to 
disband. What explains the United States' mixed response? One view is that the 
Dnited States regarded these researchers with concern, so having them in one 
place facilitated monitoring and control and prevented "proliferation" of nuclear 
manpower.17 Another view is that the United States wanted Taiwan to main-
tain some kind of "near-nuclear capability" by retaining these researchers' ex-
pertise. An author of Taiwan's Defense White Paper, Chien Chung, opined that 
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the United States wanted Taiwan to "keep the engine warm and await further 
instructions" (nuanji daiming). He estimates that there are still over 800 "national 
treasures" today. He notes: "It would have been quite easy to totally dissolve 
Taiwan's nuclear manpower; just give all these people U.S. passports! This is one 
reason why, although it is difficult to obtain the material, Taiwan's capability to 
research and develop nuclear weapons can never be completely ruled out."18 
The key is U.S. interests and attitudes. The George W. Bush administration's 
forceful approach toward the nuclear challenges posed by Iraq, North Korea, and 
Iran notwithstanding, if changing national interests due to geopolitical shifts (e.g., 
if the United States sees China as the main threat) require that the United States 
choose a reliable nuclear partner or proxy with sufficient technological capabili-
ties and compatible national values, Chung thinks Taiwan is a good choice.19 
The concern, however, is that a nuclear-capable Taiwan may become intransigent 
in disputes with China due to its confidence in America's support, causing the 
United States to lose escalation control in a conflict with China. Entrapment thus 
becomes plausible for the United States. 
The third lesson is that Taiwan's deep dependence on the U.S. security com-
mitment gave the United States exceptional leverage over Taiwan's nuclear aspira-
tions. Taiwan's dependence on the United States is more acute than that of Japan 
and South Korea. It is no longer under explicit treaty protection of the United 
States and U.S. support for Taiwan would have to factor in China's reaction. This 
gives the United States unusually large leverage over Taiwan's nuclear aspirations. 
For the foreseeable future, the United States can manage Taiwan's nuclear pro-
gram using a mixed strategy of preventing proliferation, maintaining near-nuclear 
capability, and sharing the fruits of peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
Needing access to international markets and nuclear technology, dependent 
on the United States, and concerned about China's possible preemptive strike, 
Taiwan's best choice was and is nuclear restraint. 
Taiwan's Current Nuclear Orientation 
Today Taiwan does not have nuclear weapons (Federation of American Scien-
tists, n.d.), but it has a fairly sophisticated civilian nuclear power industry, which 
produced over 20 percent of Taiwan's total electric power in recent years (Govern-
ment Information Office 2004: 149). Many sources put Taiwan in the category of 
"abstaining countries"-industrialized nations with the technical capacity but not 
the political desire to develop nuclear weapons (Cirincione 2007: 44; Manning 
1997-98: So; Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros 1995: 8). 
Officially, Taiwan adheres to the nuclear nonproliferation regime.20 Its 1988 
commitment to the United States went beyond the obligations mandated by the 
NPT (Mitchell 2004: 301). Although Taiwan is not a member of the IAEA, the 
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AEC conforms to IAEA code and guidance (Atomic Energy Council 2005). The 
government position on nuclear weapons is a categorical "four no's" policy-
Taiwan will not "develop, produce, store, or use" nuclear weapons (Agence France 
Presse 2004), or a stricter "five no's" policy (the four no's plus no acquisition) (Min-
istry of National Defense 2004: 221) 21 -intended to dispel any doubt. The ruling 
party from 2000 to 2008, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), went a step 
further by espousing a "nuclear-free homeland" (feihe jiayuan) on Taiwan (Execu-
tive Yuan Nuclear-Free Homeland Commission 2003). 22 
Since the termination of Taiwan's nuclear weapon program in 1988 there has 
been a normative change in Taiwan's nuclear research (Chien 2005: 475; also cited 
in Chung 2005: 21, 28). Today, all of Taiwan's nuclear programs are ostensibly for 
peaceful use. The DPP espouses a fundamentally antinuclear policy. To main-
tain its security, Taiwan counts on America's tacit security commitment and the 
international norm against the use of nuclear arms against nonnuclear weapon 
states, and maintains itself as a "virtual proliferant" through the technological 
infrastructure of a thriving civilian nuclear program. But is a "nuclear option" 
completely out of the question? 
Assessing the Nuclear "Option" 
Although it is not a member of the United Nations, as a state dependent on the 
United States for its security, it is important for Taiwan to adhere to the nonpro-
liferation regime to ensure U.S. support. However, Ta_iwan has never felt com-
pletely comfortable about the U.S. commitment to its security. Every. few years 
certain news reports or official comments would surface that called into question 
whether Taiwan still has a secret nuclear weapon program. 
Rather than judging these inconclusive reports and subsequent official deni-
als and clarifications, I analyze the role of nuclear weapons, if any, in Taiwan's 
security strategy, by taking into account both capabilities and intentions. These 
two interrelated aspects roughly correspond to "supply-side" and "demand-side" 
factors, respectively. The former relates to feasibility (whether Taiwan can do it), 
whereas the latter relates to desirability (whether Taiwan ought to do it). In the 
arms control lexicon, supply-side strategies seek to prevent the transfer of weapons 
technologies to would-be proliferators, whereas demand-side strategies seek to 
address the security concerns behind the drive for the bomb (Mack 1997: 51-52). 
For Taiwan, both its capabilities and intentions are influenced by broader fac-
tors, such as the international nonproliferation regime, technological availability, 
the regional security environment, and its threat perception, but none is more 
important than the relationship with the United States and the robustness of the 
· U.S. security commitment. As the history of Taiwan's nuclear program shows, 
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TABLE I4-2 
Factors ltifluencing Taiwan's Nuclear Decision 
Desirability (demand side) 
To offset acute power asymmetry 
between China and Taiwan (quick 
"equalizer") 
To ensure survival (existential 
deterrence) 
Last-ditch effort after being 
abandoned by the patron state 
Opposition from the patron state 
(even a pretext for abandonment?) 
Opposition from within Taiwan's 
democratic society 
PRC's possible preemptive strike 
Feasibility (supply side) 
Military nuclear technical expertise 
can be reconstituted? 
Civilian nuclear technical expertise 
Progress made in missile technology 
Military nuclear technical expertise 
degraded 
Difficulty acquiring materials 
Lack of test sites 
Secrecy can't be assured 
in shaping Taiwan's nuclear choices. They will also be crucial for understanding, 
or even predicting, Taiwan's nuclear future. Table 14-2 summarizes the enabling 
and inhibiting factors that would influence Taiwan's decision to develop nuclear 
weapons in terms of feasibility and desirability. 
Overall, although several enabling factors favor Taiwan's development of nu-
clear weapons from the standpoints of both desirability (the demand side) and fea-
sibility (the supply side), the cost outweighs the benefit, suggesting that a "virtual" 
nuclear capability is the more plausible option. 
Under what conditions can and should Taiwan cross the nuclear threshold to 
formally incorporate a nuclear weapon capability in its national security planning? 
Both capabilities and intentions are important in this calculus. 
There are divergent views on feasibility. Some believe that if Taiwan decided 
to develop nuclear weapons, it could do so quickly, perhaps within a year or two 
(Mitchell 2004: 301). With the infrastructure for nuclear research (INER and Na-
tional Tsinghua University [NTHU]) and experience with nuclear power genera-
tion, as the world's sixteenth largest economy, and with the fourth largest foreign 
exchange reserve,23 Taiwan appears, prima facie, to possess the human and finan-
cial capital needed to resume its nuclear weapon program. Others are skeptical. 
They point to the high cost to restart the program (USs10 billion), the predictable 
resistance by opposition parties, the tight monitoring and control by the United 
States and the IAEA,24 and the inability to find suitable locations on the island to 
conduct nuclear tests as reasons why the nuclear option is infeasible. 25 
There are divergent views on the desirability of nuclear weapons as well. for 
the rare voices that advocate the development of nuclear weapons, it is unclear 
whether their unorthodox comments reflect simply bravado or hint at the exis-
tence of a secret program. Officials who have made these types of remarks ha~e 
invariably retracted their comments to defuse unwanted attention. Former Prest-
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dent Lee Teng-hui, replying to a question in the National Assembly on July 28, 
1995 about Taiwan's nuclear intentions, said: "Whether or not we need the pro-
tection of nuclear weapons, we should restudy the question from a long-term 
point of view." Reuters ran a story saying that Taiwan meant to reconsider the use 
of nuclear weapons. This prompted Taiwan's foreign minister, Fredrick Chien, 
to issue a categorical denial that Taiwan had any intention of developing nuclear 
weapons, blaming the reporters for misunderstanding and misinterpreting a Chi-
nese phrase that President Lee had used (Lin 1995: 13). 
A vocal minority stresses Taiwan's need to have offensive weapons, including 
nuclear weapons, to deter China from attacking the island. A researcher affiliated 
with the Taiwan Research Institute, which is closely tied to former President Lee 
Teng-hui, argues that Taiwan cannot rely on China's pledge not to use nuclear 
weapons against Taiwan and should instead develop a counter-value nuclear de-
terrent against possible Chinese use of nuclear arms against Taiwan (Liao 1999). 
A Taipei Times (2004) editorial argues that "the ability to obliterate China's ten 
largest cities and the Three Gorges Dam would be a powerful deterrent to China's 
adventurism." To rally support for arms procurement, on September 25, 2004, 
former premier Yu Shyi-kun said that Taiwan should rely on a Cold War-style 
"balance of terror" to safeguard national security in the face of intimidation from 
Beijing (Hille 2004). It is unclear how much weight to give to these voices, but 
they are clearly a minority in Taiwan. 
A cautious international relations scholar who was dose to the OPP govern-
ment believes that Taiwan should forgo the production and development of nuclear 
Weapons to avoid the predictable intense international scrutiny and pressure, but 
keep quiet about acquiring nuclear weapons. 26 He hinted that the international 
black market would be the fastest way for Taiwan to acquire nuclear weapons. 
However, Chung disagrees: "Without testing, the quality of acquired weapons 
cannot be assured, and the numbers so acquired would be insufficient to consti-
tute a deterrent, but Taiwan's reputation would surely suffer."27 Andrew Yang 
of the Council on Advanced Policy Studies, a top think tank on security issues, 
thinks that nuclear weapons are actually a liability for Taiwan's security because 
they further complicate Taiwan's security challenge. 28 
There are good instrumental reasons for Taiwan to choose nuclear restraint 
0wing to what international relations scholars call "security interaction": Taiwan's 
development of nuclear weapons for self-defense might be seen as offensive by 
China and a casus belli. In an article criticizing Premier Yu's call for a "balance 
of terror," Chien Chung concludes that developing WMD for the sake of engag-
ing in a "balance of terror" with the adversary is not indispensable to Taiwan's 
national strategy nor will it enhance Taiwan's national security (Chung 2004b). 
Most government officials think that there cannot be any ambiguity in Taiwan's 
nuclear policy and that mo percent transparency is the best option. 29 
420 VINCENT WEI-CHENG WANG 
However, Table 14-2 illustrates the scenarios for contemplating the "nuclear 
option": Taiwan may cross the nuclear Rubicon if it believes that the cross-Strait 
military imbalance has become so lopsided and the prospect for Beijing to use 
force to unify Taiwan has become so imminent that only nuclear weapons can 
serve as a quick "equalizer" to preserve Taiwan's independence or as a last-ditch 
effort to draw the United States into the conflict (Rosen 2006: 12). 
Table l4-3A shows that China has all classes of WMD and delivery systems, 
but Taiwan only has short-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying conventional 
TABLE 14-3 A AND B 
Military Power of China and Taiwan 
A. Status ef Weapons of Mass Destruction (2004) 
Indicator 
Nuclear weapon status 
Chemical weapon status · 
Biological weapon status 
Short-range ballistic missile status 
Medium-range ballistic missile status 
Intermediate-range ballistic missile status 
Submarine-launched ballistic missile status 
Intercontinental ballistic missile status 
Strategic bomber status 


























SOURCES: Author's compilation of National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) Research Team findings, 2004, 
obtained through Strategic Asia data query service, available at http://strategicasia.nbr.org/Data/DataSheet/ 
Criteria.aspx; and Nuclear Threat Initiative (NT!). 
'CSS-6 (DF-15/M9), CSS-7 (DF-11/M-n), CSS-8 (DF-7). Over 650 OF-II (M-11) and DF-15 (M-9) are 
deployed opposite Taiwan. · 
bCSS-2 (DF-3), CSS-5 (DF-21). Several dozen that can reach japan, India, and Russia. 
'CSS-N-3 U-1) 
d30+: 24 CSS-4 (DF-5A), 8 CSS-9 (DF-31), CSS-3 (DF-4). Two dozen or so can reach the U.S. and Europe. 
'1 
fBTWC: acceded; CTBT: signed but not ratified; CWC: signed and ratified; NPT: acceded. 
gChing Feng, Tien Chi. 
~he ROC ratified the NPT in 1970. After its expulsion from the United Nations in 1971, ROC said it would 
abide by CWC, BTWC, and NPT. 
B. Defense Spending and Economy (1990-2005) 
China Taiwan 
GDP Defense Defense GDP Defense Defense 
(s billions, expenditure expenditure (S billions, expenditure expenditure 
PPP) (s billions) (%ofGDP) PPP) (s billions) (%of GDP) 
1990 413 11.3 3.1 151 8.7 5.4 
1995 3,500 33.0 5.9 291 13.1 5.0 
2000 4,500 42.0 3.9 386 17.6 5.6 
2005 8,182 81.5 4.3 612 7.9 2.4 
SOURCES: Author's compilation oflISS, Military Balance data obtained from Strategic Asia data query ser.vice 
(http://strategicasia.nbr.org/Data/DataSheet/Criteria.aspx); and CIA, The World Factbook (http://www.odci 
.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html). 
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warheads. Table 14-3B shows the rapid increase in China's defense spending since 
1990, powered by the huge expansion of China's economy. As the Pentagon's 
recent reports on China's military power indicate, China has devoted substantial 
resources to weapon systems that can be used in asymmetric war to intimidate or 
actually attack Taiwan and prevent U.S. intervention (Office of the Secretary of 
Defense 2006). 
The only imaginable scenario in which Taiwan could pursue the nuclear option 
is if three conditions were present concurrently: (1) there is a serious problem in 
the credibility of America's tacit extended deterrence commitment; (2) the United 
States is perceived as ready to abandon Taiwan in the face of Chinese assertive-
ness; and (3) the cross-Strait military balance has become so lopsided in favor 
of China that only nuclear weapons could restore some (semblance of) balance. 
These are extraordinary conditions under which the unthinkable could happen. 
Only a "perfect storm" caused by an increasing Chinese military threat, deteri-
orating regional security, and abandonment by the United States might force Tai-
wan to cross the nuclear Rubicon. 
The impact of Taiwan becoming a nuclear weapon state on regional security 
is expected to be largely negative. China has declared that Taiwan's development 
of nuclear weapons would be a casus belli. 30 The dual shock caused by the "dem-
onstration effect" of America's abandonment of Taiwan and a militarily more bel-
ligerent China could cause Japan to renounce its decades-old pacifist policy and 
reconsider the nuclear option. 
However, there is at least one scenario in which nuclear weapons might be used 
on behalf of Taiwan. The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (2002) listed "a military 
confrontation over the status of Taiwan" as one of the "immediate contingencies" 
that the United States must prepare for and mentions China by name as a nuclear 
target. That scenario, representing a breakdown of deterrence, risks escalation 
With incalculable consequences. 
Assessing Taiwan's Nonnuclear Options 
Taiwan can certainly explore two political strategies of security: (1) negotiat-
ing with the PRC-the only state that threatens Taiwan's survival-to establish 
confidence-building measures; and (2) joining regional or global institutions to 
socialize the international community and mitigate the risk China poses to Tai-
wan's security. However, the first strategy is fraught with problems. At the very 
least, it would require Taiwan to renounce the pursuit of de jure independence in 
return for Beijing's promise not to use force against Taiwan. The DPP govern-
rnent is unwilling to consider this compromise, although the incoming Ma Ying-
jeou administration may be so inclined. Some question Beijing's trustworthiness. 
It seems confidence-building measures result from, rather than give rise to, a long 
Period of fostering mutual trust. Given the deep mistrust between the two sides, 
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counting on China for Taiwan's security requires a leap of faith unsupported by 
evidence. 
The second political strategy is also impractical. Beijing's isolation strategy-
that demands all states and international organizations to respect its "one China" 
principle-means that few are willing to take on the issue of Taiwan's security 
for fear of antagonizing China. Beijing's refusal to permit Taiwan more "inter-
national space" contributes to Taiwan's alienation from China. 
This leaves only the United States as a possible counterweight to China. As 
long as Taiwan feels reasonably assured by the U.S. security commitment, albeit 
implicit and not unconditional, it can forgo the costly nuclear option. Pursuing 
such an option might alienate its chief security backer. 
Can Taiwan address its security challenges with conventional military force 
and other "low politics" measures? As argued earlier, Taiwan relies on economic 
globalization, democracy, self-defense, and possible U.S. intervention to protect 
its security. On the self-defense front, apart from nuclear weapons, Taiwan has 
enjoyed a qualitative edge and is currently improving its conventional capability. 
Military conflict in the Taiwan Strait is likely to be conventional in nature, 
launched by China to either punish Taiwan for taking measures Beijing deems 
as crossing the "red line" or to compel Taipei to accept unification on Beijing's 
terms. Because China's political objective is to unify and not destroy Taiwan's 
economy and infrastructure, its nuclear arsenal is basically irrelevant to that objec-
tive. If China were to threaten nuclear weapons against Taiwan, it would result in 
worldwide condemnation and sanctions. Any hope of winning Taiwanese hearts 
would be dashed. 
China's rapid acquisition of ballistic and cruise missiles and power projection 
capabilities suggests it is pursuing coercive diplomacy. As section two showed, 
Taiwan has responded by adopting various defensive measures, such as hardening 
critical facilities, creating redundancy in command and control systems, maintain-
ing air superiority, strengthening antisubmarine capability, and developing bal-
listic missile defense (BMD) capability. 
Taiwan also has achieved some progress on offensive conventional force. In 
2006, Chinese-language media reported that Taiwan's Ministry of Defense was 
building the country's first-ever "strategic force" that would have a small-scale 
fighting capability in 2007 (United Daily News 2006). This capability will rely on 
Taiwan's improved missiles, which now have a range of 600-1,000 kilometers-
enough to reach Chinese cities like Shanghai; the aim is to further improve the 
range to 2,000 kilometers, the distance to Beijing. In April 2007, upon complet-
ing its Han Kuang computer war games, Taiwan's Defense Ministry informed the 
American observers that Taiwan now has "Tactical Shorebase Missiles for Fire 
Suppression" (TSMFS) with a range of up to 1,000 kilometers. The Ministry said 
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that TSMFS is a passive system designed to counter an attack by China and will 
only target the mainland's airports and missile batteries, not civilian installations 
(China Post 2007). Although the United States did not support Taiwan's develop-
ment of such systems, Taiwanese officials argued that such systems are necessary 
for self-defense, enabling the island to counter a mainland attack for some time 
before friendly countries can come to Taiwan's assistance. To assuage the United 
States, President Chen Shui-bian promised that Washington would have the last 
say over the island using such weapons against the mainland (South China Morning 
Post 2007; New York Times 2007). 
Taiwan's progress in missile technology represents a notable technological ac-
complishment for countering China's rapid missile buildup. It is inconceivable 
that Taiwan will fire the first shot, because it would be met with massive re-
taliation by China. Yet from Taipei's standpoint, possessing some longer-range 
missiles might complicate China's force calculus and raise the cost of coercive 
diplomacy. Until BMD becomes more reliable, many countries will find that of-
fense is much cheaper than defense. Taiwan will thus simultaneously pursue BMD 
and quietly develop TSMFS. In light of China's continual missile buildup and 
improved performance, the United States will soon face two critical choices that 
could cause diplomatic controversies-whether to sell Taiwan the Aegis-equipped 
destroyers ("postponed" in 2001) and whether to include Taiwan in the U.S.-led 
BMD in East Asia. 
If the improved missiles carry only conventional warheads, they are unlikely 
to deter a China that is willing to use nuclear weapons ·against Taiwan, although 
China would have to pay a very high political price for such blatant deviation 
from its NFU policy. The missile accomplishment has rekindled speculation on 
the status of Taiwan's strategic (including nuclear) capabilities. Might Taiwan's 
missile program provide China with a pretext for a "preventive war"? While the 
Bush Doctrine may have lowered the bar for countries to justify this traditionally 
dubious concept in international law, it is difficult to deny that Taiwan developed 
these missiles as a reaction to China's missile intimidation. 
Given the current security situation in East Asia, Taiwan has to walk a tight-
rope with its security strategy. It must continue increasing the stake for the 
international community in its economic and democratic example. It must do 
everything possible to maintain U.S. political and military support. It must not 
give China any excuse to make an unprovoked attack. If it should seek to acquire 
a nuclear weapon capability, Taiwan must do so in the most discreet manner. 
These are stringent requirements. Nevertheless, the "nuclear option" will always 
exist for a Taiwan facing existential threat from a powerful adversary. Meanwhile, 
Taiwan needs a comprehensive strategy that combines hard and soft power to en-
sure its continued survival as a separate state. 
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Notes 
1. For more discussion, see Tan, Walker, and Yu (2003) and Swaine (I999). 
2. Swaine, Yang, Medeiros, with Mastro (2007) examine the various military options. 
3. Roberts (2007) explores the "how likely?" and "how stable?" of the nuclear dimen-
sion in a Taiwan contingency. 
4. Military Balance (2007: 373-75) and www.globalsecurity.org. 
5. SIPRI Arms Transfer Database. Available at http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/ 
output_types_ TIV.html. 
6. Welfare spending absorbed I7.7 percent of government expenditure in 2004, but 
only 8.9 percent in I994· The share of defense spending dropped from 23.7 percent in 
1994 to I5.4 percent in 2004. Defense expenditure has been in decline in the last decade: 
5.7 percent of GDP or USs11.2 billion in I994; 3.2 percent or USs9.I billion in I999; 
2.4 percent or US$7.9 billion in 2005 (Ministry of National Defense 2004: I44). 
7. Norris, Arkin, and Burr (I999), Appendix B: Deployment by Country. 
8. For the text of the NPT, see http://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.html. 
9. For details of Taiwan's nuclear weapon program, see Mitchell (2004), Albright and 
Gay (I998), and Burr (1999). The best and hitherto most detailed work written in Chinese 
is Chung (2004a: 133-68). 
IO. Albright and Gay (1998: 55); Wu (1988), quoted in Albright and Gay (I998). 
11. Interview with Dr. H, former INER researcher, Taipei suburb, Taiwan, Decem-
ber 2I, 2005. 
12. Chung (2004a: 155); interview with Dr. H. 
I3. The U.N.'s recognition of the PRC as the only legal government of all China-the 
so-called "one China" policy-raised the interesting possibility that Taiwan could claim 
nuclear weapon state status, but in the end, Taiwan decided to accede to the requirements 
of the NPT and the IAEA, and through a trilateral nuclear agreement the United States 
became the ultimate guarantor of Taiwan's nonnuclear status, facilitate~ by IAEA inspec-
tions (Mitchell 2004: 297-98). 
14. Weiner (1997); China Post (2000). Chang had apparently been recruited by the 
CIA some ten years earlier during his doctoral study at the University of Tennessee. There 
were more suspected moles planted by the CIA inside INER. Interview with Dr. H. 
15. See also Lilley's testimony at the "Hearing of the Commission on the Roles and 
Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community," U.S. Senate, January 19, 1996. 
Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/commission/testlill.htm. 
16. Interview with Dr. Cheng-yi Lin, research fellow, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Tai-
wan, December 16, 2005. 
17. Interview with Arthur Ding, December 23, 2005. 
18. Interview with Chien Chung, National Tsing-hua University, Hsinchu, Taiwan, 
December 20, 2005. 
19. Interview with Chien Chung. 
20. Interview with Michael Tsai, deputy minister of national defense, Taipei, Taiwan, 
December 23, 2005. 
21. See also ibid.; and interview with Chien Chung. . 
22. Interview with Dr. Min-sheng Ouyang, minister, Atomic Energy Council, Taipei, 
Taiwan, December 20, 2005. 
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23. Taiwan's gross domestic product (in purchasing power parity) in 2006 was esti-
mated at USs668.3 billion, and its foreign exchange reserves as of 2006 were USs280.6 
billion (CIA, The World Factbook). 
24. Interview with Dr. Chong-pin Lin, former deputy defense minister, Taipei, De-
cember 16, 2005. 
25. Arthur Ding, interview. 
26. Interview with an international relations scholar, Taipei, Taiwan, December 16, 
2005. 
27. Chien Chung, interview. 
28. Interview with Andrew Yang, December 21, 2005, Taipei, Taiwan. 
29. Interviews with Deputy Minister Michael Tsai and Minister Ouyang. 
30. Over the years, depending on the changing situation in the Taiwan Strait, China 
has altered the conditions under which it might use force against Taiwan, despite its pro-
fessed policy of"peaceful reunification." The most recent such conditions are included in 
the 2000 white paper on the Taiwan issue and the 2005 Anti-Secession Law. 
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